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I. Introduction
In In re Dispirito, a decision of importance to Chapter 13 debtors’ attorneys, the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey ruled that an undersecured creditor was entitled
not only to adequate protection payments, but that the section 507(b), 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006),
“super-priority” status of the inadequate adequate protection provided during the case meant that
the Chapter 13 plan had to pay those amounts before paying any of the debtor’s attorneys fees.
371 B.R. 695, 695 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007). This article will compare how the Dispirito court’s
ruling compares to other bankruptcy court’s rulings. It will also analyze “super-priority” status
in the context of benefits it confers to creditors and debtors and if it furthers bankruptcy law
principles in general. It is the opinion of this author that the Dispirito court erred in its ruling,
and in fact will likely hurt Chapter 13 proceedings without conferring much of a benefit to
creditors.
Part II will examine the concept of adequate protection and what rights section 507(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code confers to creditors in the context of adequate protection payments. Part
III will discuss the Dispirito decision, analyzing how and why the court arrived at its decision.
Part IV will discuss how other courts have ruled on this issue, giving perspective on how other
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bankruptcy courts have dealt with the issue of adequate protection and “super-priority, and
whether Dispirito is consistent with these holdings. This article will conclude with a brief
overview of how the Dispirito decision may, in fact, be against the goals of bankruptcy law and
might potentially injure both creditors and debtors.

II. Section 507(b) – What is Adequate Protection and this business about Priority?
When a debtor files for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, the debtor may remain in
possession of property belonging to the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (2006). The Bankruptcy
Code does, however, limit this right of retention. In order to protect an undersecured creditor
whose property is depreciating daily in value from the continued use by the debtor, Congress
enacted section 363(e) which provides:
[A]t any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or
leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or
without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is
necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.
11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006)(emphasis added). Thus was established adequate protection. The
Bankruptcy Code does not define adequate protection, but section 361 provides a non-exhaustive
list of examples. Under subsection (1), if the creditor’s property is declining in value due to its
use, sale or lease, the trustee may be required to make cash payments to the creditor for the
continued retention. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(1). In theory, if the creditor was allowed to regain its
property, it may resell it and avoid the loss. Because the debtor is allowed to retain the property,
thus causing the value to depreciate, the adequate protection payments are intended to protect the
creditor.
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In order to determine the depreciating value of the property, thus how much the adequate
protection payments will be, courts have looked at “the most frequently used and most
authoritative source of values for used automobiles[;] the N.A.D.A. Blue Book.” In re Cook, 205
B.R. 437, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997). The Cook court declared that “the average rate of
decline in the Blue Book value of the particular automobile over a three (3) month period
immediately preceding the date of the request for adequate protection should be used.” Id. at 441.
Section 507 under Chapter 11 of the United States Code lists the order in which creditors
are paid under a debtor’s plan. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (b) (2006). While section (a) gives a list of the
order to which a debtor must pay his creditors, section (b) gives a type of “super-priority” to
certain payments. Section (b) provides:
If [a] trustee . . . provides adequate protection of the interest of a holder of a claim
secured by a lien on property of the debtor and if . . . such creditor has a claim [of
administrative expenses] arising from the stay of action against such property . . .
such creditor’s claim . . . shall have priority over every other claim allowable.
Id. (emphasis added). The United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Colorado established a
three part test to determine if a payment will qualify for this “super-priority” status:
1. Adequate protection must have been provided . . . and that protection

must

have failed or must have been inadequate;
2. The creditor must have a claim [for administrative expenses]; and
3. The creditor’s claim must have arisen . . . from the use, sale, or lease of the
collateral.

In re Greenwald, 205 B.R. 277 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).
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Both section 507 (b) and the second prong of the Greenwald test require that the creditor
have a claim for administrative expenses. Administrative expenses are defined in section 503(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code, and include “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the
estate,” 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2006), and “reasonable compensation for professional
services rendered by an attorney.” 11 U.S.C. § 503 (b)(4). In the Dispirito case, the parties
argued as to which administrative expenses had priority or “super-priority” over the other.

III. The Dispirito Decision
The litigation began when, several years after executing a retail installment contract in
connection with the purchase of a Ford Explorer, Debtor filed a Chapter 13 proceeding. Ford
Motor Credit Company objected to the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan for failure to provide adequate
protection payments, violating 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 1325 and 1326. In re Dispirito, 371 B.R. 695,
696 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 1325 & 1326 (2006). The debtor modified the
plan to include adequate protection payments, but objected to the creditor’s contention that those
payments had super-priority over debtor’s attorney fees. Dispirito, 371 B.R. at 697. The debtor
contended that adequate protection payments should be paid until confirmation; thereinafter
payments should be split pro rata between the creditor and debtor’s attorney. Id. at 697. The
debtor argued that the adequate protection payments were not entitled to super-priority under 11
U.S.C. § 507(b) because creditor did not show that the payments represent actual and necessary
costs to preserve the debtor’s estate. Id.
The court agreed with Ford Motor Credit, reasoning that the creditor, having a lien on the
debtor’s property, must be afforded protection against the daily depreciation of its property. Id. at
698. The court relied on Judge Marvin Isgur’s opinion in In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790 (Bankr.
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S.D. Tex. 2006), for the position that adequate protection payments may be treated as an
administrative expense if they related to the actual use of the creditor’s property and conferred a
concrete benefit upon the debtor’s estate. In re Dispirito, 371 B.R. 695, 700 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007)
(citing In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790, 798 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006)).
Because DeSardi had involved a vehicle the debtor used to commute to work to generate
the income necessary for plan payments, the debtor in Dispirito argued that there was no benefit
to the estate since his vehicle was used only for personal purposes. Dispirito, 371 B.R. at 700.
The court rejected that position, holding that by seeking to confirm a plan that provides for
payments owing on a vehicle, the debtor “implicitly acknowledges that such expenses are both
reasonable and necessary for the maintenance and support of the debtor.” Id.
Further, the court held that adequate protection payments have super-priority over other
administrative expenses, such as attorney fees, under section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
at 701. Using the three-prong test as laid down in In re Greenwald, 205 B.R. 277 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1997), the court held Ford Motor Credit’s claim satisfied all three prongs. The Dispirito
court quoted Judge Isgur’s opinion in DeSardi once again concluding, “[i]f attorney’s fees are
paid ahead of the adequate protection payments, then adequate protection fails; the funds that
provide the adequate protection would be paid to someone besides the protected lender.”
Dispirito, 371 B.R. at 701 (quoting In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. at 801).

IV. Is Dispirito Consistent with Other Courts?
A. Some courts agree that creditors should receive super-priority over attorneys
The Dispirito opinion is consistent with several other decisions holding that the language
of § 507(b) is controlling and gives “super-priority” to a creditor’s inadequate adequate
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protection claim over administrative expenses. Dispirito cites two main decisions for the superpriority proposition; In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006), and In re Cook, 205
B.R. 437 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
In Cook, the debtor filed a plan which provided for payment of attorney’s fees prior to
any payment to the creditor. Cook, 205 B.R. at 438. The creditor, General Motors Acceptance
Corporation (GMAC), objected to this plan on grounds that its property, the automobile being
retained by the debtor, was declining in value each day and the creditor was not adequately
protected while the attorney’s fees were being paid. Id. The creditors took issue with the fact
that although typically in cases such as these, payments would be made to the creditor prior to
confirmation, the debtor’s plan called for no such payments. Id. The Cook court determined that
because the creditor’s property was declining in value due to the continued use by the debtor,
adequate protection payments were required pre-confirmation. Cook, 205 B.R. at 439–40. The
creditor next argued that it was entitled to payments post-confirmation at least equal in value to
the depreciation of the automobile. The debtor’s plan, however, called for full payment of
attorney’s fees first, thus leaving the creditor with delayed payments. The debtor rationalized
this plan in that administrative fees, which include attorney’s fees, are to paid off first. The court
held, however, that “the Bankruptcy Code does not require attorney’s fees to be paid in full prior
to payments to creditors, it simply requires that they be paid before or contemporaneously with
payments to creditors.” Id. at 443 (citing In re Shorb, 101 B.R. 185, 186 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1989).
The court went on to lay down a rule for confirmation:
A plan can not be confirmed over objection unless it provides that, upon
confirmation, each secured creditor will receive payment at least equal to the
amount of depreciation over the relevant time period. . . . If this cannot be
accomplished while also allowing attorney’s fees to be paid in full before
commencement of payments to secured creditors, the debtor will be faced with a
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choice between paying attorney’s fees over a longer period of time under the plan
on the one hand, and dismissal . . . on the other.
In re Cook, 205 B.R. 437, 443 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997)(emphasis added).
The court continued its rationale, addressing policy concerns. The debtors argued that
Congress intended to encourage use of Chapter 13 proceedings, and that “fewer attorneys [will]
be willing to receive their fees under debtors’ plans, and thus, fewer Chapter 13 cases would be
filed.” Id. at 443. The court noted that some courts have recognized this as a legitimate concern,
but in the present case, the creditors’ property is declining in value every day, and cannot be
“required to fund debtors’ plans and pay debtors’ attorney’s fees, in effect, with the depreciation
of their collateral.” Id. at 444. The court concluded, “[i]f the risk of non-payment of the debtor’s
attorney fees . . . is too great to justify taking the case . . . [it] should say something about the
case.” Id.
In In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006), the court addressed several
issues concerning adequate protection. The creditors objected to the debtors’ Chapter 13 plans
claiming they failed to protect the creditors’ interests in the collateral being retained by debtors.
The court began by analyzing the requirement of section 507(b) for payment of
administrative fees. Id. at 798. It interpreted payment of “actual, necessary costs and expenses
of preserving the estate” to include “adequate protection payments paid to enable the debtors to
use their vehicles.” Id. at 798–99. It stipulated, however, that the wording of section 507(b) must
be narrowly construed and include only concrete benefits to the estate “as opposed to the loss a
creditor might experience by virtue of the debtor’s possession of its property.” Id. at 799
(emphasis in original). The court justified this finding by the fact that “[d]ebtors in chapter 13
often need their vehicles to drive to work, which in turn allows for preservation of the estate.” Id.
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at 799. Debtors need their vehicles to drive to work, or buy necessities for their families such as
food or clothing, thus conferring a concrete benefit upon the debtor. In re DeSardi, 340 B.R. 790,
800 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
The court next began its analysis as to the status of another type of administrative
expense; attorney’s fees. While conceding that attorney’s fees are in fact an administrative
expense and thus entitled to priority, it concluded that payments to attorneys are subordinate to a
creditor’s right to adequate protection payments. Id., 340 B.R. at 790. The court looked at
Congressional intent and ruled that Congress intended that if adequate protection payments prove
to be inadequate to protect the creditor whose collateral is depreciating; these payments are to
have super-priority over every other claim allowable under section 507. Id. at 801.
B. Courts have found that a per se super-priority rule is inappropriate
The Dispirito line of reasoning has been criticized as being too permissive towards
creditors without looking at the circumstances surrounding the debtor’s plan. In In re Moses, the
creditor, DaimlerChrysler, objected to the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. 293 B.R. 711 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 2003). The plan called for payment of administrative fees first, which included attorney
fees. Id. DaimlerChrysler claimed that it was not adequately protected because payment would
be delayed for one month while the attorneys’ fees were paid. Id. at 712. After dismissing
creditor’s first claim that the attorneys should be paid in deferred cash payments, the court
discussed creditor’s adequate protection claim. Id. at 714. DaimlerChrysler found that the one
month delay was unacceptable, because its property, the automobile, was declining in value each
day.
In support of its contention, creditor cited In re Johnson, 63 B.R. 550 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1986). This case had similar facts to DaimlerChrysler’s situation, but in Johnson the payment to
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creditor would be delayed for three and one-half years. Moses, 293 B.R. at 716. The court in
Moses easily distinguished the debtor’s plan from that of the plan in Johnson based on the length
of the delay of payment to the creditor. The Moses court ultimately held that DaimlerChrysler
may have an argument “in a case such as In re Johnson, with the three-and-a-half year delay in
payments, [but] cannot . . . hold true in a case . . . where [creditor] is waiting only one month for
distributions to begin. Id. at 717.
The court did note, however, that the decision “should not be read as a per se rule that a
delay in payment to . . . creditors, caused by payment of the debtor’s attorney’s fees first and in
full, can never be a valid basis for denying confirmation.” Id. at 718. This stipulation gives
creditors assurances that the circumstances of each case will be taken into account and the length
of delay of payment will be considered a factor in the determination of confirming the debtor’s
plan.

V. Conclusion
The Dispirito ruling can be criticized for undermining the Chapter 13 process. First, as
the debtors argued in Cook, the purpose of Chapter 13 is to encourage its use. In re Cook, 205
B.R. 437, 443 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997). The Cook court warns attorneys to be wary of what
cases they take as they bear the risk of non-payment, thus chilling access to the process. See Id.
at 443–44. If attorneys are last in line to be paid, this may, in fact, cause attorneys to reject
taking these cases of this type. Those who need an attorney the most may be viewed as a
liability and a risk. Are we shutting the doors of justice to the most despondent and downtrodden? While the area of pro bono services is growing successfully today, are we prepared to
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classify Chapter 13 cases as a matter of free legal services? This ruling is a slippery slope and
must be cautiously viewed.
Further, the court’s interpretation of the necessity prong for administrative expense status
renders it a nullity since that test will be met in every case involving a Chapter 13 plan. Finally,
even if the adequate protection payments are entitled to super-priority status in an ultimate
liquidation, that does not necessarily mean they must be given temporal priority by being paid
out of the first plan installments.
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